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NOTES
THE STATES DID NOT FAIL IN LIQUOR CONTROL
By A.iDpxw J. Russm&U*
The twenty-first amendment has been submitted to the
states and adopted. It repeals the eighteenth amendment and
retains federal control over interstate shipment The amendment provides:
"Section 1. The 18th article of amendment to the Constitution
of the United States is hereby repealed.
"Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State,
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
hereby prohibited.
"Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have
been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution, within seven years
from the date of the submission thereof, to the States by the Con
gress."

One of the principal objections to this amendment was
that it would return us to a situation which existed in this
country from the adoption of the Constitution to the passage
of the eighteenth amendment. The most serious indictment
against the system of control that existed at that time was
directed at the inability of the "dry" states to prohibit shipments of liquor from neighboring states. In fact this was
the outstanding argument in favor of national control. We
may freely admit that if saloons are harmful such injury is
confined to those in the state where the saloon is located. So
far then as the saloon is concerned it can be abolished by any
state that so desires. But on the question of interstate shipment we are faced with a different proposition. By shipping
liquor from one state to another it was impossible for a state
to prohibit the sale and possession of intoxicating liquor within
its boundaries. The states were unable to cope with this
situation, hence, national control.
*A. B., Berea College, 1926; LL. B., Yale University, 1928; Associated with Dean Robert M. Hutchins and Mr. Donald Slessinger in
the preparation of articles on the law of Evidence and Psychology;
Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Louisville, since 1929.
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Now that we have returned liquor control to the states it
is important that we look into the bistory of this question from
the standpoint of constitutional law. Were the states unable
to prohibit interstate shipments? Were the charges against
the states justified? If we did encounter unsurmountable
obstacles then, will we be facing the same obstacles now that
the twenty-first amendment is adopted.
I propose to show1.

That we never had free state control until 1913.

2.

That the states were hampered until that date by federal interference.

3.

That we never had any federal cooperation until 1917 and then
for a period of only twenty-two months.

4.

That the twenty-first amendment establishes a plan of cooperative federal and state regulation.

To adequately understand the situation that existed prior
to the enactment of the eighteenth amendment it is necessary
that we go back to the case of Brown v. Maryland.' The question involved in that case was whether or not the state of
Maryland had the power to require a license for the privilege
of selling goods by wholesale which had been shipped into the
state. The license fee did not apply to Maryland manufactured goods. Brown was indicted for importing goods from
a foreign country and selling them without license. Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall in writing the opinion of the Court holding
the Maryland law unconstitutional said the federal government
would protect such goods until they became mingled with the
mass of property in the state, and that the goods did not become so mingled as long as they remained in the original package. The Chief Justice went on, by dictum, to say that the
same rule would apply to goods shipped from a sister state.
This statement was dictum because the case involved only foreign commerce. This case established -what was later known
as the "original package doctrine". The dictum purported to
extend the doctrine to interstate commerce.
In 1886, fifty-nine years after the decision of Brown v.
Maryland, Iowa passed a law prohibiting the shipment of in112 Wheat. 419, 6 L. Ed. 678 (1827).
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toxicating liquor into the state to any consignee other thani
one who had a license to sell such liquor. Bowman Brothers,
an Iowa partnership which had no license to sell such, bought
5,000 barrels of beer from a Chicago concern and ordered it
to be shipped to Iowa. The Chicago & Northwestern Railway
Company refused to carry the beer on the ground that it violated the Iowa Statute. The purchaser then applied to the
federal court for an injunction to compel the railroad company
to carry the shipment. The injunction was denied in the lower
court but the United States Supreme Court in Bownw v. Chicago & Northwestern Rallway Company,2 held that it must be
granted. The court held that the Iowa law was in conflict with
interstate commerce clause of the federal constitution.
Thus, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
Iowa must submit to the shipment of beer to a consignee who
was not allowed to sell it. This made it impossible for Iowa
to enforce its laws. The state could revoke a seller's license
because he disregarded the state law, but he could still have
beer or liquor shipped to him from another state. This decision
could not be justified on the ground that this beer was for
private consumption. The petitioner here was a partnership
and, furthermore, the consumption of 5,000 barrels of beer
would be a rather ambitious undertaking. The license law of
the state was gone in so far as receiving liquor was concerned.
But could not the state still punish one who sold this
beverage in violations of its laws? Iowa tried this and passed
a statute giving the officers power to seize any intoxicating
liquor which was being held contrary to the state law. The
constitutionality of this seizure law came before the court in
Leisy v. Hardin.3 Mr. Leisy had heard of this "original package doctrine" established in Broum v. Maryland. With this
knowledge he gave birth to a bright idea. He had a large order
of beer shipped from Illinois in quarter barrels, eighth barrels,
and sealed cases. He held this just as shipped from Illinois
and sold it in the same case in which it was shipped. The
Supreme Court of the United States held that this could be
done. The court held that Congress had the power to regulate interstate commerce; that the power to regulate included
1125 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 689, 31 L. Ed. 700 (1888).
'135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128 (1890).
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the power to protect, and that the power to ship an article
from a sister state included the power to sell it after it arrived.
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller writing the opinion of the court spoke
in very broad language. He said "under our decision in Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, supra, they
had the right to import this beer into that state, and in view
of what we have expressed they had the right to sell it, by
which act alone it would become mingled in the common mass
of property within the state. Up to that point of time, we
hold that in the absence of congressional permission to do so,
the state had no power to interfere by seizure, or any other
action, in prohibition of importation and sale by the foreign
or non-resident importer". This was very strong language
and must have been discouraging to the state which was trying to enforce its laws. The court, therefore, took the position
that the plaintiff could sell beer if he sold it in the "'original
package". This left the state with very little control over
the sale of liquor. This was done over the protest of the state.
It was not a question of the state lacking "power" to act but
of lacking "authority" to act. The federal government had
commanded the state to keep "hands off interstate commerce."
In both these cases there were dissenting opinions. Both
met with strong popular disapproval. The result was the
passage of the Wilson Act 4 in 1890. This act provided that
liquors shipped from one state to another became subject to
the laws of the latter state upon arrival. This act gave back
to the state part of its control but still did not prohibit shipment of liquor into its territory. This law gave rise to a large
mail order and express business. A person who could not
purchase liquor in his state could order it in small lots (usually
by the gallon) and have it shipped to him by express. The
states immediately voiced a protest to this business. The state
of Kentucky passed a statute prohibiting the sale of liquor
to known habitual inebriates. A gentleman falling in this
class, and not being able to purchase liquor in his home town,
ordered two packages-one from New Albany, Indiana, and
one from Nashville, Tennessee. The Commonwealth of Kentucky imposed a fine on the Adams Express Company for
4 26

Stat. at L. 313 (1890).
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carrying the liquor in violation of this statute. The case was
taken to the United States Supreme Court and the verdict
was set aside in Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky.5 The court
held that the State of Kentucky could not prevent such interstate shipments. Naturally after this the C. 0. D. business
of foreign liquor dealers grew by leaps and bounds. The states
then tried to enact laws prohibiting the shipment of liqnor
into dry territories. But the constitutionality of them was
denied.
Congress tried, to correct this difficulty by the WebbKenyon Act" in 1913. This bill prohibited the shipment of
liquor into a state to be received, possessed or sold, either in
the original package or otherwise in violation of the state law.
This law gave to the state the power that it should have had
all the time. By its interpretation the state could prohibit
the shipment of liquor into its boundaries.
The weakness of the Webb-Kenyon Act lay in the fact
that Congress did not provide it with any enforcement provisions. The federal government had the power to punish
these violators had it so desired. This it did not elect to do
until 1917 when the Reed Am endmentP became a law. This
statute provided penalties for purchasing or causing liquor
to be shipped into dry territory and also prohibited advertising liquor in such territories by use of the United States
mail and attached a penalty for violation of the law.
Briefly then the history of liquor control methods prior
to the eighteenth amendment may be summarized as follows:
1. Prior to 1890 for a period of about a hundred years the
state had no power or control over liquor shipped in interstate commerce. The state had no authority to exclude liquor
from its borders. After it came in it could be sold freely so
long as the sale was made in the original package.
2. In 1890 Congress passed the Wilson Act which made
liquor subject to state control as soon as it arrived in the state.
This law as construed denied the state authority to prohibit
shipment of liquor from another state. This statute was responsible for a large C. 0. D. and mail order business.
- 214 U. S. 218, 29 Sup. Ct. 633, 53 L. Ed. 972 (1909).
0 37 Stat. at L. 699 (1913).
139 Stat. at L.1058 at p. 1069 (1917).
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3. Congress tried by the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913 to curb
this transportation by prohibiting the shipment of liquor into
dry territory. This law was of little effect because Congress
failed to attach any penalty for its violation. By this time
a large C. 0. D. business had been built up. It was hard for
the state to combat it because in the first place the shipper
was always out of the jurisdiction of the state, making it
difficult for the state to proceed against him, and in the second place the carrier could always plead ignorance of the contents of the package it was carrying.
4. In 1917 the federal government did what it should have
done more than a hundred years before. It stepped in to prevent interstate shipments of liquor into dry territory, and to
punish violators.
This brief summary shows clearly that it was not a lack
of ability on the part of the state in keeping liquor out, but
the real difficulty was a refusal of the federal government to
let the state act. If a state desired to bar liquor it was unable
to do so because of the federal constitution. During all this
time-until 1913-the proponents of national prohibition were
pointing to the interstate shipment problem as one with which.
the state could not cope. They were pojnting to the C. 0. D.
business and saying that if one wanted liquor all one had to
do was "order it". The system of state control was being
bombarded with all this avalanche of criticism when the plain
truth is that this type of business was being forced on the
states over their protest, by the federal government.
After March 3, 1917 the system was put into operation
that should have been in use all the time. By virtue of the
Reed Amendment enacted on that day the federal government
assumed control of the interstate business and left to the state
the control of the local business. This placed each government where it belonged, and where it could work most effectively. Bad this been done seventy-five years prior to the
time that it was done the eighteenth amendment would never
lave been proposed or ratified. The tragedy is that it was
not done earlier. The stage was set for proposing the eighteenth.
amendment even before the Reed Amendment was enacted.
The eighteenth amendment was certified by the Secretary of
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State on January 29, 1919, only twenty-two months after the
Reed Amend~ment was passed by Congress.
The twenty-first amendment is simply re-establishing the
system that was in effect for this twenty-two months to wbieh
I have referred. It is at least very unfortunate that we did
not give this system a trial. From the standpoint of political
science and law enforcement it was an ideal system. Each
government will be working in the sphere in which it is best
adapted. A spirit of cooperation will replace the spirit of
jealousy and antagonism.
ANDREW J. RUSSELL.
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